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CHARLES PEIRCE AT JOHNS HOPKINS

CHARLES PEIRCE AT JOHNS HOPKINS
In the company of scholars and investigators which Daniel
Coit Gilman gathered at Baltimore in the seventies and eighties
was Charles S. S. Peirce, son of the Harvard mathematician,
Benjamin Peirce, and considered by Sylvester (surely a capable
judge) “a far greater mathematician than his father.” But
great though his mathematical powers were, it is not they alone
which chiefly distinguished him among the scientists of his
generation. Mathematics was simply one of the many fields of
thought tilled by his active brain. At Harvard it was in chemistry that he had chiefly distinguished himself, but it might as well
have been in physics. While lecturing at the Johns Hopkins, he
was also conducting experiments for the U. S. Coast Survey.
But it is perhaps for his researches in symbolic logic that he is
chiefly known, being, indeed, the inventor of the logic of relatives,
since developed by Russel into the logic of relations. He himself
considered more important his theory of inductive reasoning;
which certainly is more understandable and usable, for the
logic of relatives is the acme of technicality and abstraction. As
an indication of the power of this logic, let it suﬃce to say that in
terms of it all of the two hundred and sixteen varieties of algebra
classified by his father can be expressed, among which ordinary
algebra, the algebra of imaginaries, and quaternions are special
cases. Further, any algebra whatever can be brought under the
domain of this system.
As for his theory of induction it is presented in a series of six
articles in the Popular Science Monthly for 1878, though there
is a briefer, but more technical exposition, in the Johns Hopkins
Studies in Logic; while Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology contains a number of Peirce’s contributions bearing
upon his theory. His lectures in advanced logic, delivered at
Baltimore the second semester of 1880-1881, were wholly
devoted to an examination of the logical foundations of
the leading scientific theories of the time. They were based
on his theory of induction, the gist of which is that induction
is a safe process because it is a self-corrective one. Truth
in science, as truth everywhere, is that conclusion concern48
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ing any ma er toward which tend, in the long run, the
opinions of competent investigators. If science lead us astray,
more science will set us right. But at any given time may not
common sense be right and science wrong ? In ma ers where the
judgment of common sense is based on intimate experience this
may certainly be the case, even though those who pass the judgment cannot always give an account of the manner in which they
have arrived at it. Those judgments that are the result of raceexperience most of us would be unable to distinguish from intuitions. We believe in them, but cannot tell how we have come
to believe in them. Yet if they relate to ma ers of constant
experience they may be trusted. For constant experience, by
trial and error and correction, even though these be half unconscious, leads to true ideas. Even the lower animals have such
ideas. The human animal, however, not infrequently holds to
ideas that are altogether false. When this is so, it will in most
cases be found: (1) that there has been no experience; or (2)
that the experience has occurred under conditions that have
ceased to exist; or (3) that in some other way the experience was
not typical but unique and peculiar .I t is conceivable that one
might be led to have very strong convictions about the politics
of the inhabitants of Mars; but neither the strength of one’s convictions, nor the fact that he had got a number of people to agree
with him, nor even that he had founded a society perpetuating
his ideas from generation to generation would give the least
validity to any conclusions reached by his possibly intensely
interesting speculations. The probability that one shall be right
in a ma er concerning which he knows nothing and has no
experience—direct, indirect, or remote—is zero. A blindfolded
marksman cannot be expected to hit the bull’s-eye.
With most of us true ideas and false are mingled in inextricable
confusion. Is there a way in which they may be disentangled?
Pascal seemed to think that clearness is the touchstone of truth,
-as it certainly is a help. One service of Peirce is that by his
maxim of pragmatism he has shown us how to clarify our ideas
somewhat. This maxim, as stated in the Popular Science
Monthly for January, 1878, is as follows: “Consider what
eﬀects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception
of these eﬀects is the whole of our conception of the object.”
How completely this criterion brushes aside such speculations
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as those concerning Martian politics! How many interminable discussions are cut short by its application! Two men are
hotly contending as to whether the first life on earth is due to
spontaneous generation or to special creation; they apply to a
third to decide between them. “Tell me,” he says to them,
“just what your spontaneous generation is; that is, how I am to
know it, supposing a case to occur before me; and tell me also
just how I am to distinguish a special creation. Of course, if the
phenomena are all the same, there is really nothing to dispute
about.” To be sure, the pragmatic maxim, like many another,
can be misapplied; in the opinion of its author, it has been misapplied. In fact, he later admi ed that his own statement had
been inadequate, that, besides immediate practical consequences,
one should have in view consequences in the long run, fi ing into
a general reasonable view of the universe.
A belief is a habit of thought formed, as are all habits, mainly
by repetition. To say that the belief is based on experience,
is merely to say that the occasions calling for the exercise of the
correct habit have been suﬃciently numerous to lead to its formation. To draw conclusions under the dominance of a belief is
strictly analogous, likewise, to action in accordance with habit.
Deduction is the correlative of willing; induction, of habit-learning;
reasoning by analogy or hypothesis is the correlative of feeling.
If a habit be strong, then, given the compelling circumstances, the
resulting action can be predicted. We say of a man that he
always acts in such or such away. If his habit be less strong, he
may still be liable to act in the characteristic way; and we may
perhaps say that the chances are three to one that he will. But
knowing that there were certain circumstances tending to form a
habit, we should find it very diﬃcult, wellnigh impossible, to tell
how strong a habit a man placed in those circumstances would
form. Still one could safely wager that, taken as they come, men
would be unlikely to form habits leading to disastrous results in
the given circumstances. In the long run, most of them would
certainly learn be er; a belief that mankind can walk on water
would not be likely to spring up among sailors.
Again, knowing that under certain circumstances a friend acts
in a certain way, can we from the action assume the circumstances? Can we calculate the probability that these circumstances, rather than some other circumstances, are the cause of
the action? Does the fact that this friend carries a valise tell us
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whether he is going to a train or coming from it? When one feels
that he is singing correctly, is he really singing correctly ? Is
feeling that we know anything, more than knowing that we feel?
Were those who let Sully escape at the massacre of St. Bartholomew justified in assuming that he who carried a missal was a
Catholic? Can we in any of these cases calculate the numerical
probability of the conclusion? This point is worth dwelling
upon; for it may enable us to see why Peirce, though trained as a
mathematician, was not misled by that school of mathematicians,
with Laplace at the head, who pretended to calculate the probability of an induction; as though, forsooth, one could put a lot
of universes in a hat and wager seven to three, say, that our sort
of universe would be drawn out. Does this look absurd? Well,
Laplace calculated that the odds against the then received mass
of Jupiter being in error by two per cent. was 999,308 to 1. The
perturbations of Juno proved, nevertheless, that it was two per
cent. in error. Neither did Peirce assume, as did Mill, any such
principle as the “uniformity of nature, “ but merely that, in
observing a series of events we were more likely, in the long run,
to observe what did characterise the series than what did not.
Peirce’s lectures were illustrated, as has been intimated, by
important theories from the principal sciences. At the very
beginning it was necessary to emphasise the distinction between
mathematics and the other sciences, though these others may, at
least in certain of their branches, tend to become mathematical.
It is true, as Sylvester pointed out in his controversy with Huxley,
that mathematicians use induction; but that does not make of
mathematics an inductive science. The final proofs, and no true
mathematician rests content until he gets these,—the final proofs
are always deductive. This is one characteristic of mathematical
reasoning; but another, quite as obvious, is the intricacy of the
reasoning. Whatever the subject ma er may be,—number,
space, time, force, groups, relations of any sort,—if the final
proofs are obtained by intricate deductive reasoning, then we are
thinking mathematically. In the Century Dictionary, to which
he was an extensive contributor, Peirce defined mathematics as
“the study of ideal construction& (o en applicable to real objects)
and the discovery thereby of relations between the parts of these
constructions before unknown.” This conception supplements
the earlier idea, as indeed it was supplemented in his lectures, by
pointing out that by deduction, as well as by induction, one is led
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to discover truths before unknown. For that ma er, it is hardly
likely that any considerable part of mathematics could ever have
been developed except by the help of deduction; by this process
the mathematician has been led into ideal fields that had else
remained wholly unexplored; reason has transcended imagination.
Cantor would even replace the terms pure and applied mathematics by the terms free and constrained mathematics. The
physical sciences may become, and have become in some degree,
mathematical; but free they cannot become and yet remain
physical. The service of mathematics in these sciences is that
one is enabled by it to make long-range predictions; when these
predictions are found, by observation and experiment, to be in
consonance with the facts, then there is reason to believe that a
consistent, well-ordered theory is growing up. The discovery of
Uranus verified not only the prediction thereof, but also the
previous observations and the reasoning based on these observations which led to the prediction; it verified the scientific method
of astronomy. Similarly the discovery of Galium was a verification of Mendelieﬀ ’s law and of the science of chemistry; while
the discovery of the Hertzian waves rendered a like service
to physics. Thus, there is need for the verification of mathematical deductions. Without this verification, they are dangerous conclusions; and the farther the deductions are carried, the
greater the danger. It is precisely the most far-reaching speculations of science, those that get farthest away from observed
facts, that must be suspected. It is a characteristic of many
theories, for example, the wave-theory of light, that while up
to a certain point they triumphantly explain the facts, yet, as
one pushes the theory farther and farther, a realm is reached that
is mainly a realm of conjecture. Hence the need for crucial
experiments.
The ma er was neatly illustrated one evening by Peirce before
the Johns Hopkins Scientific Society. He reviewed Priestley’s
investigation concerning atomic weights and specific heats. On
comparing the specific heats and the atomic weights of each of the
monad elements, Priestley found that he could write a formula
expressing each specific heat in terms of the corresponding atomic
weight. This is easy; any small set of numbers can thus be
paired oﬀ with another small set. But when Priestley tried his
formula upon the dyad elements, it did not work. He found,
however, that by a modification he could get a formula to hold
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for both monads and dyads. This formula did not hold, however,
for the triads. So there was another modification, and a er that
still another. When in this way he got a formula holding, say,
for half the elements, would there be any probability of its holding
for the others? If not, why not? The method taken to show
the fallacy of the assumption of such a probability was to assign
the specific heats at random among the elements and then show
that Priestley’s method would work just as well as ever. Priestley’s predictions had uniformly failed; thus no confidence could be
placed in his final prediction. Again, of all the conics that pass
through four points, only one, in general, passes through an
arbitrary fi h point. But when an astronomer calculates an
orbit from a few observations, and then finds that the planet is
always to be found following that orbit with reasonable approximation, his computation and the underlying theory are alike
verified. Why is not this an exact verification? In brief,
because observations are not exact, neither those used for the
basis of calculation nor those used to test the motion of the planet
in the orbit. Nor are we exactly given all the forces acting upon
the planet; some of them may be both unknown and unsuspected.
Our observations are discordant and have to be reduced and
smoothed by methods based on the theory of chance. Law, if
law there be in these variations, has not manifested itself, and to
us it is as though non-existent. But a study of the conception
chance has in the very negation of law revealed a reign of law.
Laws of chance, however, are never exactly kept, else would they
cease to be laws of chance and freedom would succumb to habit.
May not the laws of the universe be the acquired habits of the
universe ? May there not still be a possibility of the modification
of these habits? May there not be the possibility, forever, of the
formation of new habits, new laws? May not law be evolved
from a primordial chaos, a universe of chance? In the play of
chance still apparent may we not see the continual renewal of the
life of the universe, a continual renewal of the capacity for habitforming and growth? Tracing the evolution backwards we are
led to the conception of absolute chance. This is of course a
limiting conception; and we need not assume its actual existence,
for there are countless ways in which a limit may be forever
approached and yet never reached. It is not wise, certainly it is
not pragmatic wisdom, to go too far from facts. But does not
the universe now behave as if in transition from less of law to
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more? Does it not behave as if there were a never failing source
of new life, new energy, which is to be, in turn, brought under
the reign of law? There is a certain likeness, in all this, to the
“creative evolution” of Bergson, though to me it seems a clearer
and more definite conception than Bergson’s, and one more in
touch with science, more in harmony with experience and observation. For it does not require us to reject the supremacy of
intellect and reason; certainly it would not use the triumphs of
science as an argument against science, or say that science is
successful because of its limitations, because blind to everything
except the grossly material. Surely it is suﬃcient to admit, as does
Peirce, that many ma ers, and vitally important ma ers, have
not as yet been brought under the domain of reason; to admit
that many ma ers never can be reduced to reason; and again to
admit that action is demanded and always will be demanded, in
ma ers irrational. This is merely saying that where we have not
knowledge, we are compelled to go ahead as well as we can without it. Who shall set bounds to observation, to experiment, to
the reasoning, inductive and deductive, based thereon? Surely,
there is an infinite possibility for the formation and development
of ever new bodies of knowledge—that is, new sciences. The
conception of the universe in transition but increases this possibility; even the laws of the universe are evolving and so have
themselves laws of evolution. In the words of Peirce, “in spite
of the general shipwreck of ideas, the flotilla of knowledge is
constantly increasing.”
It would require great technicality to present any large
number of Peirce’s criticisms of scientific theory, but I will
indicate a few of these. Mechanics expresses all motion and
force in terms of five units, three of space, one of time, one of
mass. What are the masses of bodies? Numbers which we
a ach to them in order that our equations of motion may be
satisfied. Can there be action at a distance? That is, can a
body act where it is not? What do we mean by the presence of a
body except that it has certain eﬀects, exerts a certain force?
The table is there, because, when we press there, it presses back.
Very well; if repulsive forces prove the existence of a body, so do
a ractive: that is how Uranus was discovered. If, then, a body
is where it acts and the law of gravitation is true, each and every
body exists throughout the universe, and action at a distance is
not action where a body is not, but merely where its a raction
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prevails over its repulsion. The boundary of a body is the place
where vanish certain diﬀerential coeﬃcients. The reasoning by
which chemists were in the first instance led to the atomic theory
was very bad. The law of simple proportions was not helped
by the conception of atoms. The chemists did not then, or for a
long while a er, give a reason why atoms should not combine in
very complicated proportions, say 3,872 atoms of hydrogen to
11,916 of oxygen. The real proof of the existence of molecules
and atoms was furnished by physics in connection with one of
its great triumphs, the kinetic theory of gases. The triumph of
chemistry was Mendelieﬀ ’s law. The establishment of this law
was remarkable because it is diﬃcult either to establish or disestablish laws of periodicity; waves so melt into waves. For example,
it has so far baﬄed observers, whether there may not be some
connection between lunar movements and earthly weather. The
progress of chemistry will lie in the explanation of valency, which
includes why elements combine in simple proportions. Many of
the recondite phenomena of physics, chemistry, and especially
biology may be explained by supposing the atoms composed of
atomicules. To-day we should substitute “ions” for Peirce’s
“atomicules”; but his idea was prophetic. One of his most
striking lectures had to do with the application of this conception
to the phenomena of growth and reproduction. As to whether
biologic phenomena can be explained mechanically, he remarked
that the processes to which the conservation of energy is applicable are reversible, but life is an irreversible process. He held,
further, that without catastrophes from time to time the accumulation of minute chance variations by the survival of the fi est
was insuﬃcient for the development of a new species. His
reason was that chance variations, in accordance with Bernoulli’s
law, would always preserve the dominance of the original type.
He admi ed that, assuming (in accordance with his philosophy)
the habit-acquiring property in the universe, the development of
a new species by minute variations is possible; but he insisted
that the biologists had never called a ention to this fact. Remember that this was thirty years ago.
In such theories as the scientists were then developing, Peirce
saw the germ of the philosophy of the future, the foundations of an
edifice yet to be erected. The a empts of the Germans to erect
a philosophic edifice in the air, without such foundations, merely
caused him to smile. Had not the German philosophers proven
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each other false? Why give them ear? Kant, instead of asking
how are synthetic judgments a priori possible, should have asked
the simpler and more profitable question, how are synthetic
judgments possible. Perhaps he had then been led to a correct
theory of induction. As for a Ding an sich, it could be only a
thing out of relation-that is, out of existence. Mill’s Logic
he characterised as a great philosophic work, embodying the
philosophy of ordinary mankind. But Mill did not know what
was important in science. To such a degree was this true that
most of the instances of scientific induction which he gave, in the
first edition of his book, a erwards turned out to be bad inductions. Mill should have concluded from this fact that there was
something wrong with his theory. Moreover, though on first
reading seemingly clear, Mill is really not so; study of his work
brings out ambiguities and contradictions. During the beginning
of one’s study of logic, we were told—that is, during the first ten
years—one should devote oneself entirely to learning the exact
meaning of words. Mill had neglected this.
Perhaps I have, in some measure, reproduced the atmosphere
of Peirce’s Hopkins lectures. To complete the conception of the
man, it would be necessary to exhibit him in his talks before the
Logic Club, necessary to speak of his papers in the old Journal of
Speculative Philosophy and in the Monist, besides more technical
papers elsewhere. But this would require profound and longcontinued study. I may say merely that the deeper one enters
into the spirit of Peirce’s teachings the more logically and
philosophically satisfying, the more complete and harmonious
and inclusive they seem to be.
E lery W. Davis .
University of Nebraska.
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